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HASKER ON OMNISCIENCE 
Bruce Reichenbach 
I contend that William Hasker's argument to show omniscience incompatible with human 
freedom trades on an ambiguity between altering and bringing about the past, and that 
it is the latter only which is invoked by one who thinks they are compatible. I then use 
his notion of precluding circumstances to suggest that what gives the appearance of our 
inability to freely bring about the future (and hence that omniscience is incompatible with 
freedom) is that, from God's perspective of foreknowledge, it is as if the event has already 
occurred, but that as if conditions do not tell us about the conditions under which the act 
was performed (whether it was free or not). 
William Hasker's article on omniscience and human freedom contributes signific-
antly to the debate regarding their consistency. I Combining breadth with analytic 
carefulness, he has clearly articulated, better than many others, not merely the 
grounds for holding that omniscience is incompatible with human freedom, but 
how the incompatibilist would respond to the most recent defenses of their 
compatibility. Yet, despite his efforts, I remain unpersuaded. Though this only 
might suggest something about my obstinacy in the face of incontrovertible 
evidence, it might also reveal the complexity of an issue which has long plagued 
Western theistic discussions. I would hope that it is the latter, but whatever the 
case, Hasker's challenge cannot be lightly dismissed. In what follows I want to 
explore what seems to me to be a problem with Hasker's discussion, a problem 
which, if I am correct, relieves the threat to the compatibilist from Hasker's 
proposed dilemma: either we give up the traditional view of omniscience and 
deny that God has beliefs or knowledge of future free acts of agents, or else we 
commit ourselves to the dubious doctrine that we can alter the past. 
To begin, Hasker contends that invoking the distinction between hard and soft 
facts will not rescue the compatibilist; indeed, to the contrary, the distinction, 
if carefully laid out, provides support for the incompatibilist. In particular, he 
argues that 
(14) "Yahweh has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese 
omelet for breakfast tomorrow" 
is a hard fact, and that this, along with other hard facts: 
(15) "If Yahweh exists, Yahweh is God," 
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and 
(A2) "Necessarily, if God has always believed that a certain thing will 
happen, then that thing will happen," 
entails 
( II) "Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow." 
87 
So, he writes, "( II), which is jointly entailed by a set of hard facts, is itself a 
hard fact: it is now unpreventable, so that it is utterly impossible that anyone at 
all, even God himself, should now have the power to bring it about that Clarence 
does not eat the omelet for breakfast tomorrow. If the analysis of 'hard facts' 
which we have given is sound, the incompatibilist is triumphant" (136). 
According to Hasker, a hard fact is "defined as a proposition which is true 
(that is its factuality) and which is such that it is impossible that anyone should 
have the power to bring it about that it is false (that is its hardness)" (132-133). 
As such, a fact is hard if it is entailed by one or more hard facts, is a necessary 
truth, or is a true, future-indifferent proposition. Further, 
(C I) "An elementary proposition is future-indifferent IFF it is consistent 
with there being no times after the present, and also consistent with 
there being times after the present" (\33). 
Finally, he argues that (14) is a hard fact because it is a future-indifferent 
proposition. 
But what essential properties does Yahweh possess? Necessarily, in a de re 
sense, Yahweh is God. And since God is necessarily omniscient, if Yahweh 
exists, he is necessarily (in a de re sense) omniscient and cannot hold a false 
belief. But then (14) is a candidate for being a soft fact, for (14) is not a 
future-indifferent proposition. If Clarence does not have a cheese omelet tomor-
row, i.e. if the world ended now, Yahweh would not have had the belief that 
Clarence would have a cheese omelet tomorrow. That is, if there were no times 
after the present time, then Yahweh would not have had the belief expressed in 
(14). Otherwise it would have been a false belief, something which Yahweh 
cannot entertain. But then, since (14) is a soft fact, Hasker's claim regarding 
(1 I)-that it is a hard fact since it is jointly entailed by a set of hard facts-is 
not true, and the incompatibilist-at least at this juncture---cannot so easily 
snatch the victor's laurels. 
Hasker's reply to this is that we have appealed to de re necessity to establish 
our point, but only de dicta necessary truths are relevant to determining which 
propositions are future-indifferent. He makes this restriction on the ground that 
allowing de re considerations is too generous, such that "if considerations of 
this sort are relevant to the notion of a future-indifferent proposition, then there 
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will be few such propositions-but clearly, they are not relevant" (134). 
Granted that a universal admission of de re considerations effectively destroys 
the usefulness of making a distinction between hard and soft facts, in that few 
hard facts would remain, still does it follow that they are always irrelevant? It 
would seem that they are relevant in those cases where de re considerations are 
directly germane to the determination of the hardness or softness of a fact, that 
is, germane to determining whether it is in someone's power to make the prop-
osition under consideration false. This means that de re considerations can be 
employed where they are relevant to determining whether the proposition under 
consideration is truly future-indifferent. The compatibilist then can argue that 
de re considerations are relevant to and cannot be excluded from considerations 
regarding Yahweh's beliefs about the future, for since his beliefs must be true 
[a feature which distinguishes Yahweh's beliefs from those of the ordinary 
person, which point makes Hasker's introduction of (A2) relevant], his beliefs 
about the future cannot be future-indifferent; their truth depends necessarily on 
the future. 
Of course, to invoke an exception to a general application might be deemed 
suspicious, so one cannot make everything hinge on such a contention. Deter-
mining a general principle of relevance would be tricky, if not impossible. On 
the other hand, it was in terms of irrelevance that Hasker excluded all de re 
considerations. The above considerations suggest that sometimes de re consider-
ations are relevant, and that therefore the incompatibilist's case cannot be made 
quite as easily as this. Our argument will be bolstered if we can go on to show 
that there is something amiss in the main body of the incompatibilist's argument. 
To this we shall now turn. 
Hasker's main argument to show that omniscience is incompatible with human 
freedom he labels argument B. Briefly, it contends that if God has always 
believed a certain thing about how a person will act, it is not in that person's 
power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing, and hence, 
assuming that God has always believed that the person would act that way, that 
person cannot be free with respect to that act since he cannot refrain from doing 
what God has always believed he would do. What can be said about argument 
B? There seems to be an ambiguity in two rB4 & B5] of three of its crucial steps: 
(B3') "God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet 
tomorrow" (128), 
(B4) "If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's 
power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing," and 
(B5) 'Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God 
has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast" 
(123). 
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And on this ambiguity rests an equivocation. The phrase" ... bring it about 
that God has not always believed that thing" could either mean (a) bring it about 
that God has never believed that thing, or (b) bring it about that it once was but 
no longer is the case that God believed it. This latter [(b)J is not to be understood 
in the sense that God changed his belief at some point, for this is made impossible 
by God's omniscience. Rather, it is to be understood in the sense of a person 
somehow altering, retroactively, a fact about God's prior belief. It finds its 
clearest expression in Hasker's 
(19) "If at T I God had always believed that [Clarence would do X at 
T2 , and it was in [Clarence's] power to refrain from doing X at T2 , 
then it was in [Clarence's] power to bring it about that whereas it was 
true at T I that God had always believed that [Clarence 1 would do X at 
T 2 it was no longer true at T 2 that God had always believed that [Clarence J 
would do X at T2" (148). 
The truth of (B4) under the first interpretation [(a)] does not follow-as Hasker 
claims the truth of (B4) does-from the unalterability of the past, for it has 
nothing to do with altering the past, but rather with bringing about the past. The 
truth of (B4) under the second [(b)] follows from unalterability of the past. Now 
whereas (B4) in sense (b) is true, (B4) in sense (a) is not true, for given the 
antecedent it is still in my or Clarence's power to bring it about that God has 
never believed a certain thing. It is only that that power has not been exercised. 
If it had been exercised, then God would not always have (never have) believed 
that thing.' 
Now the issue of free agency has not to do with Clarence· s ability to alter a 
belief that God has about Clarence's action. If the power to do otherwise entails 
the power to alter or change a belief that God already has, then given that God 
is omniscient and cannot entertain mistaken beliefs, the incompatibilist would 
appear to be assured of his victory at the outset. Rather it has to do with Clarence's 
ability to bring about the future (freely) and coincidently to bring about God's 
belief in the first place. Regarding the latter, Clarence only needs the power to 
bring about God's belief concerning his omelet eating, not the power to change 
a belief which God already has, for what beliefs God has about what Clarence 
does depend upon what Clarence does. Since it is in Clarence's power to bring 
about what God has believed regarding his eating breakfast tomorrow, (B5), 
interpreted in the sense of (a), is false. Clarence can bring it about that God 
never believed he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. And if (B5) is false, 
then, granted the validity of Hasker's argument, either (or both) (B3') or (B4) 
is false. As I have just argued, it is (B4), interpreted in sense (a), which is false. 
Correspondingly, (B5) interpreted in sense (b) is true-Clarence cannot alter a 
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belief which God already has-but irrelevant to the issue of freedom of agency. 
Our argument rests on the distinction between bringing about and altering the 
past; how is this to be understood? In trying to understand George Mavrodes's 
interpretation of our power over the past, Hasker introduces the notion of pre-
cluding circumstances (147). According to this interpretation, we have the power 
to affect the past, but are precluded from doing so by certain circumstances. I 
believe that there is an insight here which provides a clue to resolving the 
omniscience problem, not by showing that altering the past or (19) makes sense, 
but by suggesting why there is a real difference between bringing about the past 
and altering it, and why it is only the former that the compatibilist need uphold; 
and in consequence, this insight provides a way out of Hasker's compatibilist 
dilemma. 
To begin with, Hasker asks, "Why is it that [Clarence] (apparently) lacks 
freedom to do X at T2? Because God always has believed that [Clarence] would 
do X at T2, which logically precludes [Clarence] from refraining from doing X 
at T2" (147). But one might carry this another step. What is it that precludes 
God from having always believed that Clarence would not do X at T 2? It is that 
Clarence does X at T2. That is, from God's perspective (that offoreknowledge), 
it is as if Clarence has already done X at T 2. Thus, what it is that apparently 
precludes Clarence from refraining from doing X at T 2 is Clarence doing X at 
T 2. But this relation-Clarence actually doing X at T 2 entailing that Clarence 
cannot refrain from doing X at Tr-does not then remove Clarence's freedom 
regarding doing X at T 2. It says nothing about the conditions under which 
Clarence does X at T 2. To put it another way, if it is now true that Clarence 
will do X at T 2, then there are certain precluding conditions-the truth of this-
which necessitate that Clarence cannot refrain from doing X at T2 . But the truth 
of this is conditioned by what Clarence does at T2. That is, what precludes 
Clarence from refraining to do X at T 2 is that, given that the proposition about 
his future act is true, it is as if Clarence has done X at T2 . 3 
One might, of course, be perplexed about the "as if' here invoked. Yet I do 
not think it that hard to comprehend. Consider the following. Parsons (P) has 
invented a special machine which allows him to go back in time. He enters the 
machine in 1986 and finds himself in the presence of or, perhaps better, observing, 
Quigly (Q) in 1876. P is an authority on Q, and knows immediately the situation 
Q is in. Not only that, but he remembers reading about the particular decision 
or act which Q made in that situation. Thus one might argue that from P's 
perspective what Q decides is as if already done. It is not already done, since 
P is standing there waiting for Q to do it. He has gone back in time. Yet from 
P's perspective, which is of one come back from the future, it is as if already 
done, since he knows what Q does decide. Since P strongly believes in the 
unalterability of the past, it is not within Q's power to do something other than 
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what Q in fact does in that situation. From Q's perspective his decision is not 
already made nor is the action taken, so that it is in his power at that time to 
do either x or y. From his perspective, that he will do x rather than y is indeter-
minate; it is not yet done, though at the same time he can grant that P knows 
what he will do because for him it is as if he has already done it. 
What is the significance of this introduction of precluding conditions? What 
it suggests is (1) a basis for a real difference between bringing about and altering 
the past, and (2) a basis for a difference between our inability to alter the past 
and our apparent inability to act freely in bringing about the future. Regarding 
(1), a person is precluded from altering the past because the past has already 
occurred. However, one is not precluded from bringing about the past (which 
is not future indifferent) because the past which is to be brought about has not, 
in a certain sense, occurred. For example, I cannot alter the fact that Luther was 
born or that he nailed the 95 theses to the church door. However, I can bring it 
about that Luther has a certain property, i.e. that he was born 502 years before 
I wrote this, by writing this within a certain time span. This non-future-indifferent 
propel1y he did not have until r wrote this, though it is now a property possessed 
by a long-deceased Luther. More relevant to our case, by eating an omelet 
Clarence can bring it about not only that a certain belief of God is true, but that 
God has a certain belief, though Clarence cannot alter a prior belief because he 
is precluded from doing so by virtue of an omniscient God already having that 
belief. In the latter case there are precluding conditions, in the former not. 
Regarding (2), there is a difference between the conditions which preclude 
our altering the past and those which give the appearance that we cannot act 
freely in bringing about the future. We cannot alter the past because the event 
has already occurred. And we cannot alter the future which God already believes 
(cannot do other than God believes we will do) because (from God's perspective 
of foreknowledge) it is as if we have already done the event. That in the one 
case the act was done, and that in the other it is as if done, are both the precluding 
conditions for our not being able to alter the past or the future known by God, 
and at the same time are the conditions for God having the relevant beliefs. It 
is this latter which gives the (mistaken) appearance that we cannot freely bring 
about the future. 
But note that neither case--our inability to alter the past nor our inability to 
alter the future known by God-speaks to the question of human freedom, for 
both the past action which was done and the action which we have yet to do 
can still have been or be free respectively. That is, though we cannot alter the 
future which God foresees because for him it is as if already performed, we can 
freely bring about the future, for the ground of his foreseeing it is our bringing 
it about. Hence, epistemologically the freely bringing it about precedes and 
determines his foreseeing and believing it. That is, there is nothing for him to 
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foresee or believe with respect to Clarence's eating the omelet except what 
Clarence brings about. Similarly with the past; there is nothing for God (or us) 
to know about the past unless that past is brought about. 
In short, though we are unable to alter the past (because it is past) and the 
future which God knows (for the reason that God has certain beliefs about it), 
the inability to alter has no implications for our ability in the past to bring about 
freely the past or now to bring about the future. We can freely bring about the 
future by our actions (because God's beliefs about our actions are conditioned 
by our actions), and, with respect to God's beliefs about the future, in a meaningful 
way bring about the past (because again God's beliefs about our actions are 
conditioned by our actions). 
If I am correct about this, then there really is an equivocation going on in 
(B4) and (BS), for there really is a significant difference between bringing about 
and altering. If there is an equivocation, then the compatibilist can agree that 
(B4) is true in sense (b) but at the same time hold that it is irrelevant to (BS) 
understood as relevant [i.e. as sense (a)] to the issue of divine foreknowledge 
and human freedom. And (B4) and (BS) are both false if interpreted in sense 




I. William Hasker. "Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1985). 
pp. 121-157. References to the article will be placed in the text. 
2. To put it another way. it makes sense to have a set of propositions. namely about God's beliefs 
about future contingents of free agency, which it is in someone's power-specifically the agent of 
those actions-to make false. This, of course, does not mean that God held false beliefs, only that 
statements to the effect that he held certain beliefs would be false, depending on what we do. 
3. It is this which mitigates Hasker's critique of the way we handled (B4). Hasker argues that 
interpretation (a) will not work for (B4) because "the consequent of (B4) has to do with a power 
which must be exercised under the circumstance that God has always believed a certain thing (e.g., 
that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow). So (B4) stands, and so does my 
argument for incompatibilism" (in personal conversation). But God's belief regarding Clarence stands 
under the circumstance that it is true that Clarence will eat the omelet (which he labels B I), and 
this is true because Clarence will in fact eat the omelet at T 2' Thus Clarence actually eating the 
omelet at T2 conditions the remainder, and in particular, Clarence's inability to alter God's belief 
regarding his eating. It is not enough to plead that God eternally believes x; the ground of this belief 
must be sought. 
